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Globalization has many meanings, and many effects. Here we will focus on only one of 
each: globalization as the reduction in barriers to international trade, and its effect on the 
countries that, for whatever reason, do not themselves participate in that process. It is 
often observed by proponents of globalization that, while not all countries have 
prospered during the recent upsurge in global integration, most of the countries that 
have failed to prosper, especially in Africa, have been distinctive in the extent to which 
they have remained relatively closed off from world markets. The supposed 
implications are that these countries, had they embraced trade liberalization, would have 
done better, and that, while trade liberalization by others has perhaps not helped these 
countries due to their own reluctance to participate, it has not hurt them either. They 
have only hurt themselves. 
In this paper we use the tools of international trade theory to examine especially the 
second of these implications. How has trade liberalization by the larger part of the 
world’s economy affected those countries that have not participated? Have they, 
perhaps, benefited from trade liberalization in spite of their outsider status, as 
free-riders? Or have they instead been harmed by trade liberalization, made worse off 
than if trade liberalization had not occurred?  
For the sake of argument, we will divide the world’s countries into just two types: the 
‘included’ countries and the ‘excluded.’ The included countries are those that have 
substantially lowered their barriers to international trade, perhaps as part of the trade 
liberalization fostered by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and/or perhaps through preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs) such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The excluded countries are those that have stayed out of 
PTAs and have either failed to join the GATT/WTO or who have joined but have taken 
such advantage of the provision for ‘special and differential treatment’ that their trade 
barriers have remained high. For the most part, these excluded countries have remained 
in that category through their own choice (their governments’, that is) and not because 
the included countries would not have welcomed their participation in trade 
liberalization. 
In principle, presumably, a country could cut itself off completely from world markets, 
and thus achieve an extreme form of this excluded status. From the perspective of the 
analysis here, such a country could not be hurt by globalization, since it would not be 
aware of it, except perhaps through non-economic mechanisms that we will not 
examine, such as trans-border pollution. Instead, the excluded countries that we will 
consider are engaged to some extent with world markets, exporting and importing at a 
moderate rate that is subject to trade barriers that are high, but that are not all 
prohibitive. It is the fact that they trade at all that makes them vulnerable to the effects 
of trade liberalization by others, since it may change their terms of this trade. Indeed, it 
is the effect of trade liberalization on an excluded country’s terms of trade that will be 
the sole concern of this paper, and we will examine this effect through several quite 
standard theoretical models of international trade. 
In section 2 we take our first two passes at this question by using one of the oldest tools 
of international trade theory: the offer curve. From this we will see first how an  
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excluded country might easily be expected to benefit, not lose, from trade liberalization 
by other countries. But on more careful inspection, the same tool will suggest that such 
a benefit is conditional on the relative extent of liberalization by two subsets of the other 
countries: those that export the same good as the excluded country, and those that 
import it. Indeed, much depends on the degree to which the included countries reduce 
their tariffs on the good or goods of export interest to the excluded country. 
In section 3, instead of simply taking as given the tariff cuts of included countries, we 
then ask in which sectors these tariff cuts are likely to occur. A simple ‘political 
economy’ model suggests that tariffs are not likely to be cut on the products that 
excluded countries happen to export, thus making it more likely that they will lose from 
trade liberalization by other countries. This theoretical result is, of course, motivated by 
the common observation that developing countries today face higher tariffs than 
developed countries, a fact that, on this interpretation, can be attributed to the 
developing countries’ own collective choice to exclude themselves from trade 
liberalization. 
In both of sections 2 and 3 we assume that, when included countries do lower their 
tariffs on particular goods, they do it on imports from all other countries, even the 
excluded ones. That is, this trade liberalization is done, in the WTO’s language, on an 
MFN (most favoured nation) basis. This is, of course, required by the WTO for imports 
from any countries that are themselves members of the WTO, and in fact, although it is 
not required, it seems to be fairly commonly done even for most excluded countries that 
are not members. The United States, for example, gives MFN status to almost every 
country in the world, even though it does not have to under WTO rules.1 The results in 
sections 2 and 3, therefore, show that excluded countries may be hurt by trade 
liberalization of other countries, even though they remain subject to the same tariffs as 
everybody else. 
In fact, however, they do not. Increasingly in recent years, countries who wish to 
participate in trade liberalization have done so not just through the MFN liberalization 
of the WTO, but also through PTAs negotiated among pairs or small groups of 
countries. In section 4, therefore, we examine the additional harm that is likely to be 
done to excluded countries if a significant part of trade liberalization takes this form. 
In section 5 we conclude by trying to extract some policy implications from all of this. 
Since nothing in our analysis contradicts the traditional presumption from trade theory 
that trade liberalization is beneficial for the world as a whole, we certainly would not 
conclude that this aspect of globalization should be stopped, or even slowed down. But 
the harm that it may do to excluded countries needs to be recognized, and greater efforts 
need to be made to deal with it. The most obvious way to do that, of course, would 
simply be to include them more fully in trade liberalization. 
                                                 
1  There are only two or three exceptions, including Cuba and North Korea. MFN status for China was, 
of course, a matter of annual controversy before China joined the WTO, but in practice, in spite of 
threats to withdraw it, China was regularly granted MFN status.  
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2  When can a country free ride? 
The simplest analysis of the effect of one country’s liberalization on another is provided 
by offer curves. Suppose there are two countries, A and E, where E will be the 
‘excluded country’ throughout the analysis in this section. Both countries produce and 
trade two goods, X and Y. If E exports good X, then its offer curve is something like 
OE in Figure 1, showing the quantities of X that it is willing to export in exchange for 
various quantities imported of good Y. The slope of any line from the origin to the 
curve is the relative price of good X. The curve OE indicates that country E will import 
more of good Y only if it gets a higher relative price for its export of good X, or 
equivalently, if it pays a lower relative price for its import of good Y. The curve also 
suggests that a higher relative price of X will elicit more exports from country E, 
although from the curvature it is possible that beyond some point a further increase in 
price will cause a fall in exports. The reason is that a rise in the relative price of X is an 
improvement in country E’s terms of trade, meaning that its real income rises, and it 
may choose to use this income to consume more of both goods, thus exporting less. In 
any case, it is this improvement in the terms of trade that we will be looking for, to see 
whether country E may benefit from liberalization elsewhere. 
If E were itself engaged in free trade, then we could easily use trade indifference curves 
(see Meade 1952) to indicate the level of welfare within country E, since these would be 
tangent to any price line from the origin where it crosses the offer curve. However, since 


















Nonetheless, because a tariff reduces a country’s imports below what would be optimal, 
a rise in its terms of trade that permits it to import more will always improve its welfare. 
Therefore it will be enough, in order to infer effects on country E’s welfare, to see what 
happens to its terms of trade. 
In Figure 1, country E engages in trade with a single other country, A, which is an 
exporter of the other good, Y. Initially country A, like E, has a tariff on its imports of 
good X. Then, for whatever reason (perhaps because it newly recognizes the gains from 
trade), it reduces that tariff. The effect, familiar from offer-curve analysis, is to shift A’s 
offer curve outward, away from the origin, as shown, to OA'. Equilibrium moves from 
point 1 to point 2 in the figure, and the terms of trade of the excluded country E 
improve. Thus the excluded country benefits from country A’s liberalization. 
Of course, if the world really contained only these two countries, then one might 
wonder whether country A would really liberalize to this extent, since the improvement 
in E’s terms of trade is a worsening of A’s. For this reason country A, if it were 
sensible, might not reduce its tariff to zero, since doing so would cause it to forego some 
of the benefits of levying a monopoly tariff, which given country E’s continuing 
protection there is no reason for it not to use. But if A previously had a tariff above the 
monopoly level, then it could gain by a tariff reduction, and country E, as shown, would 
gain along with it. In any case, as we now consider a world with a larger number of 
countries, such monopoly-tariff considerations become less relevant. 
For the two-country case is hardly what we want to see. In practice, our excluded 
country confronts a large world of a great many countries, all of whom may be 
liberalizing. If we can think of the foreign offer curve, OA, as representing the 
aggregate of all those countries, then Figure 1 suggests a much more relevant gain for 
the excluded country E as a free-rider on global liberalization. It must, of course, be true 
that, since E is an exporter of good X, the rest of the world must in aggregate be a net 
importer of good X, and therefore the world’s offer curve does indeed look something 
like OA. Since trade liberalization by any country must cause its offer curve to expand 
outward, Figure 1 may seem to guarantee that, in fact, excluded countries can only gain 
from the rest of world’s liberalization. 
That is not the case, however. While it is true that individual country offer curves 
expand with their liberalization, and it is also true that any group of countries may be 
represented by an aggregate offer curve that is, in effect, their sum, it is not true that 
liberalization by those countries necessarily expands the aggregate offer curve outward. 
Suppose, for example, that the rest of world consists of just two countries, one that 
exports Y and the other that imports it. If the latter imports less than the former exports, 
the offer curve of the two together will look like OA in Figure 1. But if now only the 
second of these two countries were to lower its tariff (on Y, since that is what it 
imports), it would import more Y and thus reduce, not expand, the amount that the two 
together export. The aggregate offer curve would shift inward. 
To correctly identify the effect of liberalization on world markets, then, we need to 
separate countries with different trade patterns. This is done in Figure 2, where we now 
take the excluded country E to be very small compared to others, as suggested by 
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two countries, A that exports Y and B that exports X. In the initial equilibrium at 
point 1, world prices are determined (since country E is negligibly small) by the offer 
curves OA and OB. Now, as A and B both reduce their tariffs, both offer curves expand 
outward by some amounts, perhaps to OA' and OB', and the new equilibrium is at 
point 2. As drawn, the terms of trade of country E worsens. It is hurt by the rest of 
world’s liberalization. 
What determines this result? Most simply, country E (as an exporter of X) will be hurt 
if, at initial prices, those countries that are also net exporters of X expand their trade 
more than those countries that are net importers of X. This in turn depends, though only 
in part, on the sizes of the two groups of countries’ tariff reductions. If the X-exporters, 
whose relevant tariffs are on Y, reduce their tariffs more than the Y-exporters, whose 
relevant tariffs are on X, then other things equal we may expect country E to lose. 
Conversely, in order for country E to free ride on others’ liberalization, it needs greater 
reductions in tariffs on what it exports than on what it imports. This is not exactly right, 
even in this simple two-good case, since countries may differ for various reasons in the 
extent to which their quantities of trade respond to tariff reductions. But as a first 
approximation in ignorance of these other determinants of trade, what matters is these 
two sets of tariff reductions. 
It is obvious why the excluded country gains from others’ reductions in their tariffs on 
its exports. These cause increases in demand for its export good on world markets and 
thus increase its world price. But why do other countries’ tariff cuts on its imports 
matter at all? The answer is that these tariff cuts cause world prices of the imports to 
rise, reducing what the excluded country can get in exchange for its exports. In a 
two-good model, there really is no difference between a rise in export prices and fall in 
import prices, and the same is true with many goods if one looks at appropriate indexes 
of the prices of both. However, in the real world people seldom do look at such indexes,  
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and the public and political perception of the effects of export prices and import prices 
may be quite different. We will look next at a model that allows for this. 
3  Which tariffs will fall with multilateral liberalization? 
The point of this section is to argue what may seem obvious: that countries that do not 
themselves participate in tariff liberalization are likely to find that other countries do not 
reduce tariffs on their exports. Obvious or not, this does not follow easily from the 
simple welfare economics of tariffs, which says that the gain to importing countries 
from lowering their own tariffs does not depend on whether other countries do. Except 
for terms-of-trade motivations in large countries—which some, though not all, regard as 
implausible motivators for trade policies—the rest-of-world will always benefit from 
lowering its tariffs on a country’s products, even if that country keeps its own tariffs 
high. Of course, the same reasoning implies that we should already see tariffs close to 
zero in most of the world, which we do not, and which we certainly did not see prior to 
the liberalizations undertaken under the GATT/WTO. 
To answer this question, then, we must have some sort of model of the political 
economy of trade policy. Such models have been built and increasingly refined in the 
trade literature, with early efforts by Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Mayer (1984), and 
Hillman (1989), whose approaches were then integrated successfully by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). For the purpose here, however, a much simpler framework will 
suffice, one that could perhaps be viewed as a simplification of the Grossman and 
Helpman model. 
The true welfare effects of a tariff reduction include the following, as a simple partial 
equilibrium model would suggest: a gain to domestic consumers; a loss (of tariff 
revenue) to the domestic government; a loss to import-competing domestic producers; 
and—if the size of the importing country is large enough for the tariff cut to raise the 
world price of the good—a gain to foreign producers and a loss to foreign consumers. In 
a world where the tariff was the only prior distortion, it is well-known that the sum of 
these effects must be positive—that is, the world as a whole gains from a tariff cut. The 
importing country alone also gains if it is small enough that the world price is 
unaffected, but it may not gain if the worsening of its terms of trade outweighs the 
efficiency gain. 
All of this may be beside the point, however, if political forces favour some 
constituencies over others, as seems to be the case given that virtually all countries, and 
especially many small ones, have had positive and often quite high tariffs throughout 
history. The political economy literature explains this by allowing producers to exert 
special influence on trade policy, by one means or another. Grossman and Helpman, in 
particular, model producers as contributing financially to incumbent politicians in return 
for their providing or maintaining tariff protection. The politicians, in turn take account 
of both the contributions that they receive and also broad economic welfare in making 
their policy decisions. 
Here, however, we will assume instead that policymakers in most countries are 
concerned  only about producer welfare, ignoring completely any gains or losses to 
consumers and, in most cases, ignoring also any effects of tariff revenues. This could  
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perhaps be justified along the lines of Grossman and Helpman as an extreme case of 
putting all weight on the contributions that politicians receive. However it could also be 
motivated less cynically by observing that the gains and losses to producers, very much 
including their employees, are much easier to see than the gains and losses to 
consumers. Also, because they tend to be concentrated on small groups in the 
population, the severity of effects on producers is evident, while the effects on 
individual consumers may be dismissed as too small to worry about. As for also 
ignoring tariff revenues, that would be a dubious assumption in a country where tariffs 
provide the bulk of government revenues, and we will bring it back into the analysis for 
such countries below. But in advanced countries with many other (and more efficient) 
revenue-generating opportunities, it seems plausible that these revenues might also play 
only a negligible role. 
In order to incorporate this simple assumption into a correspondingly simple model, we 
follow Grossman and Helpman in assuming that preferences are ‘quasi-linear’ so that, 
except in a numeraire sector in which we always assume free trade, demand in each 
country for each good depends only on its price relative to the numeraire. And we go 
even further than Grossman and Helpman on the production side. They assumed 
specific factors in each sector, with labour mobile among sectors. We assume that all 
factors are specific, so that output in each sector in each country is simply fixed. We 
also follow Grossman and Helpman in assuming that all goods are only final goods, so 
that there are no imported intermediate inputs. That is an important limiting assumption, 
as we will note. 
Suppose, then, that there are C countries, c = 1,…,C, and G+1 goods, g = 0,1,…,G, with 
good zero the aforementioned numeraire. All countries share the same demand 
functions for the non-numeraire goods, Dgc = 1–pgc, g = 1,…,G, so that trade patterns 
depend only on differences across countries in exogenous production levels. These take 
either of two values, a low value  g X  in countries that will be importing the good, and a 
high value  g X  in countries that will be exporting it.  
Although we will assume there is some trade, even before any liberalization, it is worth 
noting the autarky prices that follow from these production levels and demands: 
countries with low production have a high autarky price, denoted  g g X p − =1 ~ , while 
countries with high production have a low autarky price,  g g g p X p ~ 1
~ ~ < − = . Let 
} | { g gc
C
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Now consider the possibility of all countries moving to free trade, denoted ‘F’, in all 
sectors. The world price—given by (2) but with 
0
g t  replaced by zero—is then simply the 
average of the two autarky prices with weights equal to the fraction of countries with 
each. Relevant to the choice of whether to make this change is the change in producer 
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Thus, as one would expect, looking only at producers’ welfare, the move to free trade in 
one sector causes exporters to gain and importers to lose.2 It is easily confirmed, 
however, that the sum of these changes across all countries is positive, simply because 
individual exporters produce more than individual import-competitors. Summing (5) 
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Thus even from the perspective of producers alone, the world as a whole benefits from a 
move to free trade. 
Individual countries may not gain in this sense, however. Certainly they lose in 
particular sectors if they are importers and a positive tariff is reduced, since that hurts 
their competing producers. And while it is true that if positive tariffs are reduced in all 
                                                 
2  If we allowed for traded intermediate inputs, it would not be this simple. A local producer could 
benefit from a tariff cut on its input.  
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sectors, then they are likely to have export-sector producers who gain at the same time 
that import-competing producers lose, there is no guarantee that the gain to the former is 
larger, for a given country, than the loss to the latter. In an extreme case, a country could 
be an importer of every good other than the numeraire, in which case it would have no 
producers who gain. And even if we require a plausible mix of export and import 
sectors outside the numeraire, if a country happens to export only in sectors with a large 
number of other exporting countries, then its exporters will gain little from the 
liberalization. Thus there may well be countries that stand to lose, from this 
producers-only perspective, from a multilateral move to free trade. Such countries 
would presumably not participate in such a move.3 
Thus an actual liberalization, if it occurs in this framework, is likely to include only a 
subset of the world’s countries: a group of countries for whom MFN4 tariff reductions 
benefit their export-sector producers more than they harm their import-competing 
producers. Of course, by not including tariff reductions by countries outside that group, 
the gains to the former are likely to be smaller than if all countries had moved together 
to free trade. But this may be offset by the included group simply not reducing tariffs on 
products that its members do not export. 
Note that in this framework, a country would never unilaterally reduce its tariffs.5 To do 
so would provide no benefit at all to its exporters, and only harm its import competitors. 
So for MFN liberalization to occur, countries must find others who are willing to reduce 
their tariffs as well, so as to create benefits for their exporters. Whether such willing 
participants can be found is uncertain. It depends on the patterns of comparative 
advantage across countries. 
Suppose, to take a simple example where limited liberalization can succeed, that there 
are two or more goods that importing countries do not produce at all. Then a group of 
countries who export different ones of these goods will necessarily benefit, as 
producers, if they agree to reduce tariffs on these goods alone, since the export-sector 
producers in each will gain from the others’ tariff reductions, and they will not have any 
import-competing producers who will lose. Thus we know that there may exist a group 
of countries that will willingly reduce their tariffs on a set of goods. On the other hand, 
suppose that all countries but one are importers of all goods except the numeraire, on 
which by assumption all have zero tariffs. Then there will not exist any group of 
countries willing to reduce tariffs at all. 
The important point, however, is the following. Suppose that there does exist a set of 
countries, S
C, that are willing to reduce tariffs on a set of goods, S
G. And suppose that 
any good within S
G is exported only by countries not in S
C. Then producers in the 
countries of S
C will gain at least as much by excluding that good from S
G as by 
                                                 
3  In addition, the assumption here that governments care only about producers, and not even about their 
own revenues, is particularly questionable in poor countries where tariff revenues may bulk large in 
government budgets. Such countries, even if their export-sector producers would gain more from 
liberalization than their import-competitors would lose, might opt out of liberalization for that reason. 
4  We will look at preferential agreements in the next section. 
5  Again, this need not be the case if there are traded intermediate inputs. Indeed any input that is only 
imported and not produced domestically would be eliminated based on the interests of producers that 
use it.  
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including it, and they will gain strictly more if any of them produce this good. Thus in 
this model we should not expect multilateral liberalization by a subset of the world’s 
countries, if it occurs, to include goods that are exported only by countries outside that 
group. Again, of course, this would not be the case if consumer welfare were taken fully 
into account.6 
If the outside countries export goods that are also exported by some of the inside 
countries, then producers in the latter would lose if these goods were removed from S
G. 
Their governments might still accept this exclusion, however, if they have other export 
producers who gain sufficiently. 
The conclusion from this section, then, is that excluded countries are not likely to 
benefit from MFN liberalization by other countries, simply because these other 
countries are not likely to reduce tariffs on the goods of greatest export interest to the 
excluded countries. Somewhat ironically, this would not be the case if a particular 
excluded country were very similar, in its pattern of trade, to the countries that are 
liberalizing. But it is certain to be true if the excluded countries are distinctly different 
from the included ones, as perhaps by being less economically developed. 
4  Preferential trade liberalization 
So far we have considered only MFN liberalization. But an increasing amount of trade 
liberalization in recent years has taken the form of PTAs. In these arrangements, as 
required by the WTO, the liberalization is typically more extreme, with tariffs reduced 
further and on more goods than may be covered in a multilateral WTO agreement. They 
are, however, discriminatory. Countries that are not part of a particular PTA continue to 
be subject to what are still called the MFN tariffs of the PTA countries, although the 
MFN name is now insidiously misleading. Countries outside a PTA are not being 
treated as well as the ‘most favoured nation’ at all, but instead have their exports to 
countries within the PTA taxed at a higher rate. 
The literature on PTAs, starting with Viner’s (1950) analysis of customs unions and 
continuing today, emphasizes the positive and negative effects that arise from ‘trade 
creation’ and ‘trade diversion.’ This seems to suggest that if the former somehow 
outweighs the latter, then the PTA is beneficial. That may be true for the countries 
inside the PTA, and perhaps even for the world as a whole. But it is very unlikely to be 
true for the countries that remain outside the PTA. For them trade creation is largely 
irrelevant, while trade diversion represents a loss. That is, when a PTA causes a member 
country to import from a partner rather than from an outside country, that constitutes a 
fall in demand for the product of the outside country. If the affected trade flow is large 
enough to matter at all, then this will cause a fall in the world price of the imported good 
and a worsening of the terms of trade of the outside country. 
This does not have to happen. PTAs can take several forms, in particular with regard to 
the tariffs that the countries levy on trade from outside. If these tariffs are low enough, 
then the countries of the PTA may continue to trade with the rest of world as much as 
                                                 
6  On the other hand, allowing the government to care about tariff revenues would only make the point 
stronger.  
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they did before. Kemp and Wan (1976), for example, showed that a customs union 
could set a common external tariff that would keep net imports of every good from the 
rest of the world unchanged, thus assuring no impact at all on the wellbeing of the rest 
of the world.7 However, if external tariffs are not changed when the PTA is formed, as 
is usually the case in a free trade area (FTA), then the fact that the preferences favour 
trade with partners over trade with outside countries suggests that trade with the rest of 
world is likely to fall.  
If that happens, then the effect on the excluded countries is exactly like Figure 1 in 
reverse. That is, the collective offer curve of the countries of the FTA before it is 
formed is OA', and formation of the FTA shifts it inward to OA, causing a worsening of 
the excluded country’s terms of trade. 
Even with an FTA and unchanged external tariffs, this is not a necessary outcome, 
although it seems far more likely than the alternative. For example, in a two-country 
model, suppose that the FTA includes countries A and B which import goods X and Y, 
respectively, over positive tariffs. When they eliminate these tariffs on trade with each 
other, at the initial world price each will import from the other instead of from the 
outside world, as long as each can supply all of the other’s needs at a price differing 
from the world price by less than the tariff. If this is the case, then whatever may have 
been the two-countries’ combined trade with the world before the FTA, this trade 
shrinks to zero in its presence. Only if the countries differ in size by enough that one of 
them cannot meet the other’s demands at such a price will the two together continue to 
trade with the world at the initial price. And even then it is likely that their combined net 
trade will shrink.8,9  
Thus, while exceptions do seem to be possible, on the whole it seems that preferential 
liberalization is even more likely to be harmful than multilateral liberalization to those 
countries that do not participate in it. Note that this does not require that trade diversion 
somehow outweigh trade diversion, but just that it occur at all. The same conclusion can 
also be obtained by different means in different models. Chang and Winters (2002), for 
example, argue (and support empirically, with data from MERCOSUR) that preferential 
liberalization favouring one of two Bertrand competitors will cause the unflavoured firm 
to lower its export price. No doubt there are many other mechanisms that could work as 
well. 
 
                                                 
7  Panagariya and Krishna (2000) showed a similar result for free trade areas. 
8  However, this does not seem to be inevitable. In analysis not included here, it appears to be possible to 
construct a case where opposite income effects in the two FTA countries cause an increase in their net 
trade with the world. 
9  Another case would have both of the FTA members importing the same good from the world. If their 
tariffs are the same, then the FTA has no effect on this trade. But if their tariffs are different, then as 
pointed out by Richardson (1995), the high-tariff country will import as much as possible from the 
low-tariff country, which will expand its imports to replace those of the high-tariff country. In this 
case, too, net trade of the two may expand since, in effect, the tariff of the high-tariff country is 
rendered irrelevant.   
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5 Conclusion 
This analysis suggests that, although it is not inevitable, it is strongly likely that 
excluded countries will be hurt by trade liberalization by other countries. It may be true 
that, if tariff reductions are MFN on products that are selected at random, then an 
excluded country has as good a chance of gaining from them as of losing. But MFN 
tariff reductions have not in practice been in randomly selected sectors, but rather in 
sectors in which the tariff-reducing countries stand most to gain as exporters. Thus 
tariffs are unlikely to be cut on products that are primarily exported by the excluded 
countries. Furthermore, much of the trade liberalization that has occurred in recent years 
has been preferential, not MFN. While preferential liberalization usually covers (almost) 
all products, its discriminatory nature means that it tends to divert trade away from 
excluded countries and thereby makes them worse off. 
It is also true that these losses from trade liberalization occur only because the excluded 
countries do in fact trade. The effects discussed here all work through the terms of trade, 
and a country would be immune from them if it did not trade at all. But this is no reason 
not to trade, for these losses all represent a reduction of their gains from trade, not a 
reduction of welfare to below what it would have been in autarky. Thus the excluded 
countries would be ill-advised to exclude themselves even further from world markets 
as a means of avoiding these losses. It won’t work. 
Nor is it a reason for trade liberalization itself to be restrained, at least not in its MFN 
manifestation. As should be clear from this analysis, the reason that excluded countries 
may lose from trade liberalization is that the liberalization does not go far enough, not 
that it goes too far. It is the exclusion of some sectors and/or some exporting countries 
from the benefits of tariff cuts that creates a bias against excluded countries. 
Thus the best chance of avoiding these losses to excluded countries is simply not to 
exclude them. Or, if they cannot be persuaded to participate, we need to find a 
mechanism for cutting tariffs that will work across all sectors instead of favouring only 
the export sectors of the participating countries. 
The current multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda show 
promising signs of doing exactly this. Developing countries are playing a more active 
role than ever before, at least in pressing the developed countries to reduce trade barriers 
in sectors of export interest to them. At the same time, developed countries are insisting 
that the developing countries also participate more than they have before by reducing 
their own tariffs. If both of these outcomes can be achieved, developing countries—at 
least those who participate—will stand to gain substantially. Even those countries that 
remain outside the WTO may gain from this, to the extent that tariffs are reduced on 
their exports as well. 
Preferential liberalization, in the form of proliferating FTAs, poses a more difficult 
problem. If this proliferation does not abate, there are only two ways that an excluded 
country may hope to avoid being harmed by it. One is to join in and negotiate FTAs of 
its own with as many partners as it can. Unfortunately, the poorer a country is, the less 
likely it is that others will have any interest in negotiating with it. And even if FTAs 
were to be formed including all possible pairings or groupings of countries, the 
administrative complications of conforming to all of their rules would put the poorest 
countries as a disadvantage.  
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The other route toward lessening the harm from preferential liberalization, as it affects 
excluded countries, is for nondiscriminatory liberalization to render preferences 
meaningless. If MFN tariffs were all zero, then any FTA would be both unnecessary and 
ineffective. Thus the best cure for the side effects of preferential trade liberalization is 
nondiscriminatory trade liberalization. 
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